Battle of San Carlos (1982)

Battle of San Carlos
Part of Falklands War

Argentine Air Force Dagger gun camera on May 24
Date 21–25 May 1982
Location San Carlos Water, Falkland Islands
Result British establish successful beachhead
Belligerents
 United Kingdom  Argentina
Commanders and leaders
Sandy Woodward
Jeremy Moore
Michael Clapp
Gen. Mario Menendez
Brig. Ernesto Crespo
Strength
2 destroyers
7 frigates
11 Landing ships
Sea Harrier CAPs
90 fighter-bombers on mainland
2 KC-130 Hercules tankers
10 attack aircraft on the islands
Casualties and losses
1 destroyer sunk
2 frigates sunk
8 ships damaged
4 helicopters lost
49 killed
22 aircraft lost[1]
11 pilots killed

The Battle of San Carlos was a major battle between aircraft and ships that lasted from 21 to 25 May 1982 during the British landings on the shores of San Carlos Water (which became known as "Bomb Alley"[2][3]) in the 1982 Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas). Low-flying land-based Argentine jet aircraft made repeated attacks on ships of the British Task Force. It was the first time in history that a modern surface fleet armed with surface-to-air missiles and with air cover backed up by STOVL carrier-based aircraft defended against full-scale air strikes. The British sustained severe losses and damage, but were able to create and consolidate a beachhead and land troops.

Contents

Background

After the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands the United Kingdom initiated Operation Corporate sending a Task Force 12000 km south in order to retake the islands. Under the codename Operation Sutton the British forces planned amphibious landings around San Carlos, on an inlet located off Falkland Sound, the strait between East Falkland and West Falkland. The location was chosen as the landing force would be protected by the terrain against Exocet and submarine attacks, and it was distant enough from Stanley to prevent a rapid reaction from Argentine land troops stationed there.[4] The landing took the Argentines completely by surprise; Argentine Navy officers had considered that the location was not a good choice for such an operation, and had left the zone without major defences.[5]

Argentine aircraft

Argentine forces operated under range and payload limitations as they had limited refueling resources and were operating at maximum range.

British amphibious force

British air cover was provided for the first time by "Harrier carriers". These small carriers deployed only short-takeoff, vertical-landing Harriers, subsonic aircraft with less range and payload than land or conventional carrier-based aircraft.

Engagements

This is a list of the main sorties carried out by Argentine air units showing approximate local time, Aircraft and Call signal.

May 21

The Argentine Army force on site was a section from the 25th Infantry Regiment named Combat team Güemes (Spanish: Equipo de Combate Güemes) located at Fanning Head. The British fleet entered San Carlos during the night and at 02:50 was spotted by EC Güemes which opened fire with 81mm mortars and two recoilless 105mm rifles. They were soon engaged by British naval gunfire and a 25-man SBS team and forced to retreat, losing their communications equipment but shooting down two Gazelle helicopters with small-arms fire.

1st Lt Carlos Daniel Esteban from EC Güemes informed Goose Green garrison about the landings at 08:22 (he was finally evacuated by helicopter on May 26). The Argentine high command at Stanley initially suggested that a landing operation was not feasible at San Carlos and the operation was just a diversion. Finally, at 10:00, a COAN Aermacchi MB-339 jet based on the islands was dispatched to San Carlos on a reconnaissance flight. In the meantime, the FAA had already started launching their mainland-based aircraft at 09:00.

May 22

Bad weather over the Patagonia airfields prevented the Argentines from carrying out most of their air missions; only a few Skyhawks managed to reach the islands. The British completed their surface-to-air Rapier battery launcher deployments.

May 23

May 24

On May 24 night there was a kind of mutiny between the Argentine pilots on the continent, who said they would refuse to continue flying if the Army and Navy did not join the battle. General Galtieri, acting president of Argentina, decided to visit Comodoro Rivadavia the next day, May 25 (Argentina's National Day), to try to convince them to keep fighting, but when he arrived in the morning the pilots had changed their minds and were already flying to the islands.[14]

May 25

Aftermath

I think the Argentine pilots are showing great bravery, it would be foolish of me to say anything else

John Nott British Defence Minister [19]

In spite of the massive air defence network, the Argentine pilots were able to attack their targets but, although undoubtedly brave, some serious procedural failures prevented them from getting better results - most notably problems with their bombs' fuses. Thirteen bombs [20] hit British ships without detonating. Lord Craig, the retired Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: "Six better fuses and we would have lost".[21] The British warships, although themselves suffering most of the attacks, were successful in keeping the strike aircraft away from the landing ships, which were well inside the bay.[22] With the British troops on Falklands soil, a land campaign followed until Argentine General Mario Menéndez surrendered to British Major General Jeremy Moore on June 14 in Stanley.

The subsonic Harrier jump-jet, armed with the most advanced variant of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile, proved capable as an air superiority fighter.

The actions had a profound impact on later naval practice. During the 1980s most warships from navies around the world were retrofitted with close-in weapon systems and guns for self-defence. First reports of the number of Argentine aircraft shot down by British missile systems were subsequently revised down.[23]

See also

External links

References

  1. ^ [9 Dagger, 5 A-4C, 3 A-4Q, 3 A-4B & 2 Pucara]
  2. ^ Yates, David (2006). Bomb Alley - Falkland Islands 1982. Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781844154173. 
  3. ^ "Americas | Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note". BBC News. 1999-03-15. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/297414.stm. Retrieved 2010-02-07. 
  4. ^ clarin: Julian Thompson interview
  5. ^ Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro: La Guerra Inaudita, ISBN 987-96007-3-8, ... consideraban que el desembarco Britanico no podia ser alli ... debido a un concepto naval que asociaba la capacidad de una flota con su espacio de maniobra para un desembarco ...
  6. ^ Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View
  7. ^ "Major Carlos Tomba’s Pucara". BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/07/in_pictures_traces_of_conflict/html/3.stm. Retrieved 2009-06-24. 
  8. ^ Some sources identify this ship as the Rio Carcaraña but other sources place the cargo vessel in Bahía Rey ( King George Bay ? ) at the time
  9. ^ Board of Inquiry - Report into the Loss of HMS Ardent, page 2
  10. ^ La balada del piloto bahiense y el estanciero kelper (Spanish)
  11. ^ Primer Teniente Guadagnini
  12. ^ 3ra. Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque
  13. ^ "Carlos Zubizarreta". http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/project/year_pages/1982.htm. Retrieved 2009-December-06. 
  14. ^ Costa, Eduardo José (1988). Guerra Bajo la Cruz del Sur. Hyspamérica, p. 334. ISBN 950-614-749-3 (Spanish)
  15. ^ Official site of the Argentine Air Force: Fuerza Aérez Argentina - Martes 25 de Mayo (Spanish)
  16. ^ Piaggi, Italo A. (1986). Ganso Verde. Ed. Planeta, p. 83. ISBN 9503701864. (Spanish)
  17. ^ Cpt Tomas Lucero interview
  18. ^ HMS Broadsword damage control
  19. ^ Los Angeles times, May 27 1982
  20. ^ "British Ships Sunk and Damaged - Falklands War 1982". Naval-history.net. http://www.naval-history.net/F62brshipslost.htm. Retrieved 2010-02-07. 
  21. ^ Gethin Chamberlain (5 April 2002). "Would British forces be able to retake the Falklands today?" (subscription required to access archive service). The Scotsman: p. 12. Archived from the original on 5 April 2002. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_dat=xri:pqil:res_ver=0.2&res_id=xri:newsuk&rft_id=xri:newsuk:newsart:112991016. 
  22. ^ Pablo Carballo: Halcones sobre Malvinas
  23. ^ Of 14 kills and 6 probables, only one Argentine aircraft was shot down by Rapier, as originally noted by Ethell and Price. Similar discrepancies arose over other weapons systems, notably Blowpipe (one confirmed kill as against nine confirmed and two probables in the White Paper) and Sea Cat (zero to one against eight confirmed and two probables in the White Paper). FREEDMAN, Sir Lawrence, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign (Abingdon, 2005). Volume II, page 732-735